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Identifying the effect of parental incomes on child outcomes is difficult due to the correlation 
of unobserved ability, education levels and income. Previous research has relied on the use 
of instrumental variables to identify the effect of a change in household income on the young 
adult outcomes of the household’s children. In this research, we examine the role that an 
exogenous increase in household incomes due to a government transfer unrelated to 
household characteristics plays in the long run outcomes for children in affected households. 
We find that children who are in households affected by the cash transfer program have 
higher levels of education in their young adulthood and a lower incidence of criminality for 
minor offenses. These effects differ by initial household poverty status as is expected. 
Second, we explore two possible mechanisms through which this exogenous increase in 
household income affects the long run outcomes of children – parental time (quantity) and 
parental quality. Parental quality and child interactions show a marked improvement while 
changes in parental time with child does not appear to matter. 
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Household conditions and characteristics certainly play a role in determining
the outcomes of children. The strength and nature of that role has been an
important research area for social scientists. One characteristic is of special im-
portance for economists ￿household incomes. Does having more money in the
household produce better child outcomes over time? Alternatively, does growing
up in poverty produce worse outcomes for children? It is exceedingly di¢ cult to
answer these questions because household incomes are not exogenously given.
Income depends crucially on parental characteristics, both observed and un-
observed. Therefore, simply observing that children from high (low) income
families tend to have positive (negative) educational, income and employment
outcomes in young adulthood tells us little about the actual causation. Par-
ents transmit to their genetic o⁄spring some of their innate abilities and the
observed correlation between parental incomes and child outcomes later in life
may simply re￿ ect this intergenerational transfer and not the e⁄ect of income
per se.
Researchers have sought to overcome this endogeneity problem by using a
number of instrumental variables and ￿xed e⁄ects techniques that attempt to
isolate the di⁄erence in household incomes that are not due to parental charac-
teristics or ability. Using father￿ s union and occupational status as instruments
for income, Shea (2000) ￿nds that income has no e⁄ect on child outcomes while
Chevalier et al. (2005) ￿nds that permanent income matters in children￿ s edu-
cational attainment. Maurin (2002) uses grandparent socioeconomic status as
a predictor of parental incomes which is then used to explain a child￿ s perfor-
mance in early education. He ￿nds that a child is much less likely to be held
back in school the higher the household income. Loken (2007) uses the Norwe-
gian oil boom of the 1970￿ s and 1980￿ s, which only a⁄ected a few regions of the
country, as an instrument for increases in household income that is unrelated
to parental characteristics. She ￿nds that there is no e⁄ect of family income
on child educational attainment. Mayer (1997) uses household assets and child
support payments as measures of household income (these are taken to be less
closely related to parental characteristics) and she ￿nds that income has a pos-
itive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on educational attainment and wages. Blau (1999)
uses child ￿xed e⁄ects in the NLSY data and ￿nds that parental income (at
least the transitory component) does not a⁄ect child test scores.
Previous research has found con￿ icting results with regard to the e⁄ect of
household income on the young adult outcomes of household children. None of
those studies have been able to identify a truly exogenous income shock at the
household level. Our approach attempts to overcome the standard household
income endogeneity problem in a direct manner - we observe households where
incomes are increased exogenously and permanently through a governmental
transfer program without regard to parental human capital, ability or other
household characteristics. In our study, the increase in incomes is community-
wide. We follow children that reside in households with and without exogenously
increased incomes. The children are sampled in three age cohorts. The youngest
2children reside as minors in households with higher incomes for a longer period
of time than the oldest children in this study. We compare outcomes from the
youngest age cohort to the oldest age cohort to determine the e⁄ect of residing
in a household with exogenously higher incomes. The children from households
without additional household income serve as a control for any changes in local
labor market opportunities that may have arisen between the age cohorts.
Our study uses data from the Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth
(GSMS). In this longitudinal study of child mental health in rural North Car-
olina, both American Indian and non-Indian children were sampled. Halfway
through the data collection, a casino opened on the Eastern Cherokee reserva-
tion. A portion of the pro￿ts from this new business operation is distributed
every six months on an equalized, per capita basis to all adult tribal mem-
bers regardless of employment status, income or other household characteristics.
Non-Indian households are not eligible for these cash disbursements. Figure
1 provides a clear depiction of the change in household incomes over the ￿rst
eight survey waves of our study. A marked increase is noted in the number
of households with incomes above $30,000 for the treatment (American Indian)
households after the disbursement of casino payments in 1997.1 No long-run
change is observed for non-Indians households.
We ￿nd that children who reside the longest in households with exogenously
increased incomes tend to do better later in life on several outcome measures.
The children in these households are more likely to have graduated from high
school by age 19; by age 21 the children from the poorest households have al-
most an additional year of schooling. Additionally, we ￿nd, using administrative
records on criminal arrests, that these same children have statistically signi￿-
cantly lower incidence of criminal behavior for minor o⁄enses. These children
also self-report that they have a lower probability of having dealt drugs than
children from households una⁄ected by the additional income.
As expected, the poorest households in the survey experience the largest
gains in terms of child outcomes. Separating the data according to prior poverty
status, we ￿nd that results are driven primarily by changes in the poorer house-
holds.
There are numerous mechanisms that may translate higher household in-
comes into better child outcomes. We explore two potential mechanism: parental
quality and parental quantity. The additional income may allow the poorer
households to substitute away from full-time employment towards part-time
employment thus allowing for more child care. This does not appear to happen
in our data; parents do not reduce their working time and we ￿nd some evi-
dence that they may actually intensify their labor e⁄orts. On the other hand,
we ￿nd that parental interactions and experience with the children in the af-
fected households tends to improve dramatically. Both child and parent report
improved behavioral e⁄ects and parent-child interactions relative to una⁄ected
1We use the percentage of households by group (American Indian vs. non-Indian) that
have household incomes greater than $30,000. This corresponds to the median value of non-
Indian households in the survey wave 3 which was just prior to the opening of the casino.
3households. We observe that parent behavior, similar to those of the child,
tend to improve with regard to criminality and drug use.2 Previous research
has found a direct relationship between poverty and parenting ability (McLeod,
1993; Sampson, 1994; Ennis, 2000) and we con￿rm this result in our research.
There is at least some indication that one of the mechanisms responsible for
translating higher household incomes into better child outcomes is through in-
creased parental quality; while parenting time does not appear to have been an
important causal factor.
The next section describes the data from the Great Smoky Mountains Study
of Youth and our empirical methods. Section III provides our estimation results.
We explore some potential mechanisms which may play a role in translating
increased incomes into better child outcomes in Section IV. Section V concludes.
2 The Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth,
Empirical Methods and Data Description
The Great Smoky Mountains Study of Youth (GSMS) is a longitudinal survey
of 1420 children aged 9, 11 and 13 years at intake that were recruited from 11
counties in western North Carolina. The children were selected from a popula-
tion of approximately 20,000 school-aged children using an accelerated cohort
design.3 American Indian children from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
were over sampled for this data collection e⁄ort, survey weights are used in
the child outcome regressions that follow. The federal reservation is situated in
two of the 11 counties within the study. The initial survey contained 350 In-
dian children and 1070 non-Indian children. Proportional weights were assigned
according to the probability of selection into the study; therefore, the data is
representative of the population. Attrition and non-response rates were found
to be equal across ethnic and income groups.
The survey began in 1993 and has followed these three cohorts of children
annually up to the age of 16 and then re-interviewed them at ages 19 and 21.
Additional survey waves are scheduled for these children when they turn 24 and
25 years old. Both parents and children were interviewed separately up until
the child was 16 years old; interviews after that were only conducted with the
child alone.
After the fourth wave of the study, a casino was opened on the Eastern
Cherokee reservation. The casino is owned and operated by the tribal govern-
ment. A portion of the pro￿ts are distributed on a per capita basis to all adult
tribal members.4 Disbursements are made every six months and have occurred
2Similar results were found in the Moving to Opportunity program (Kling, et. al, 2007;
Kling, et. al, 2005). In this case, low-income households were given the means to move into
lower poverty neighborhoods. Incidence of mental illness decreased for parents and youth.
Additionally, in previous research utilizing the GSMSY data, Costello, et al. (2003) found
decreased mental illness for children from households that were lifted out of poverty as a result
of the casino income.
3See Costello, et. al (1996) for a thorough description of the original survey methodology.
4All adult tribal members received these per capita disbursements. If there were any
4since 1996. The average annual amount per person has been approximately
$6000. This income is subject to the federal income tax requirements.
2.1 Empirical Speci￿cations
We compare young adult outcomes for children that resided for a total of six
years as minors in households with increased incomes to children who resided
for just two years as minors in households with increased incomes. Essentially
the older children (initially 13 year old cohort) serve as a control group for the
younger children (initially 9 year old cohort) in this study. This speci￿cation
allows us to compare the e⁄ect of four additional years of higher household
incomes on young adult outcomes for these children. The data also contains
a middle age cohort (initially 11 year old age cohort) which allows us to test
whether or not two additional years of higher household incomes have an e⁄ect
on young adult outcomes.
The size of the exogenous increase in household incomes can take on two
di⁄erent values depending upon the number of American Indian parents in each
household. It is possible for there to be 0,1 or 2 American Indian parents
in each household.5 Clearly households with two American Indian parents will
have double the amount of exogenous income than households with only a single
American Indian parent. Households without an American Indian parent serve
as a control household. These control households are also representative of the
entire income distribution ￿both rich and poor households are represented in
this group.
We employ a methodology based on a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences methodology.
In our case, we employ the two youngest age cohort variables (Age 9 and Age
11) which function as the ￿after-treatment￿ cases and the oldest age cohort
(Age 13) functions as the ￿before-treatment￿case. The number of American
Indian parents in the household (NumParents) serves to distinguish between
the control and test groups. We treat the number of parents as a continuous
variable and we therefore have two interaction variables which are of interest.
The equation below details the speci￿cation:
(1) Yi = ￿ + ￿1 ￿ Age9i + ￿2 ￿ Age11i + ￿ ￿ NumParentsi + ￿1 ￿ Age9i ￿
NumParentsi + ￿2 ￿ Age11i ￿ NumParentsi + Xi￿ ￿ + ￿i
In the equation above, Y is the outcome variable of interest for the child at
ages 19 or 21. We will examine educational attainment, high school completion
non-compliers (American Indian parents that either did not receive or refused the additional
income) then any estimates found here would be an under estimate of the true e⁄ects of
additional income.
5In some cases, the biological parent does not live in the same household. In these cases,
while the child is not necessarily living in a household with the additional income, he or
she still has a parent with exogenously increased income. The inclusion of these households
should actually reduce the e⁄ect of household incomes on child outcomes if there is no direct
e⁄ect of the additional income for non-resident parents on their children. We have excluded
these households and ￿nd that in general while the sample size is reduced and standard errors
increase, the results tend to hold for most of the reported outcomes.
5variables and measures of criminal arrests at various ages. In the equation
above, the Age9 and Age11 variables indicate whether or not the child is drawn
from the initially age 9 or age 11 cohorts respectively ￿the age 13 cohort is
the omitted category in this regression. The variable NumParents indicates
the number of American Indian parents in that child￿ s household. The two
coe¢ cients of interest for this research are and , which measure the e⁄ect of
receiving the casino disbursements and being in either the age 9 or age 11
cohorts relative to the 13 year old cohort and not receiving any household casino
disbursements. The vector X controls household conditions prior to the opening
of the casino and includes household poverty status, average household income
over the four years, the sex of the child, the race of the child and education
levels of both parents. Survey weights are employed in all of these di⁄erence
in di⁄erence regressions. Appendix I provides robustness tests, where possible,
for the outcome variables described above. Additionally, robustness tests are
provided for changes in parental outcomes as well.
Identi￿cation of equation 1 relies on the fact that the di⁄erent age cohorts
of children were randomly sampled within American Indian and non-Indian
groupings. The next section provides evidence for this fact and also indicates
that the two groups of households (American Indian and non-Indian) faced
similar conditions in the labor market and with regard to social conditions. It
is also important to note that there were no new health or educational programs
which were created immediately after the advent of casino disbursements by the
tribal government. This is important in establishing the fact that time variant
characteristics that were related only to American Indians (such as tribally-
funded anti-crime programs or tutoring programs) are not the causal factor
here. In later years new programs have been developed, but for the crucial
period in which these children were minors in their parents￿households, there is
little evidence of any new programs. An additional important point is that the
e⁄ect of this new industry, casino gambling, may have a rather large e⁄ect on
the demand for labor in the local labor market. This increase in demand may
a⁄ect the long-run aspirations, discount rates and human capital investment for
children in the community. I control explicitly for this by using distance of
the household to the casino. Using global positioning data (GPS) I compute
a distance measure and ￿nd that inclusion of this measure does not diminish
the e⁄ects reported in later tables. The distance measure is meant to capture
the increased likelihood of a household which is located in close proximity to
be a⁄ected through the labor demand e⁄ects than a household located further
away from the casino.
Given the panel nature of the data, we are also able to utilize individual
￿xed e⁄ects for one of the outcome variables ￿child￿ s school attendance. This
educational measure is meaningful at various points throughout the child￿ s life,
not just at young adulthood as is the case with the other educational attainment
measures. Therefore, we employ a ￿xed e⁄ects regression for the number of days
a child is present at school in the last three months prior to the interview. The
regression is given of the form:
6(2) Yit = X0
it￿ + ￿0 + ￿i + ￿it
In this regression, ￿i is the individual ￿xed e⁄ect and X is the vector of
control variables, including whether the individual child, i, belongs to a house-
hold that is eligible for casino payments. This indicator variable is always zero
for households without American Indian parents; for households with Ameri-
can Indian parents the variable is zero for the ￿rst four survey waves and then
take the value of one thereafter. We employ a similar model when testing for
changes in parental employment status, drug use, arrest, and relationship with
their children in the second half of the paper which investigates the mechanisms
through which additional household income a⁄ects young adult child outcomes.
2.2 Data Description
Table 1 provides the means for the data used in this analysis by the type of
household. The ￿rst panel provides the variables used primarily in the di⁄er-
ence in di⁄erence regressions, while the second panel provides the data used in
the ￿xed-e⁄ects regressions. In panel A, the ￿rst set of columns provides the
means and standard deviations for the households with at least one American
Indian parent and the second panel contains the means and standard devia-
tions for households that do not have any American Indian parents. It is worth
noting that children from households with at least one American Indian parent
have statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent educational attainment on average as
compared to children from households with no American Indian parents.6 On
all measures, children from the ￿rst type of household have lower recorded ed-
ucational attainment or completion. Interestingly, there is almost no di⁄erence
in the drug or alcohol use between children from these two types of households
at age 21. This result stands in stark contrast to the results for their parents.
Fathers from households with at least one American Indian parent have almost
twice the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse (9% versus 5%) of households
with no American Indian parents.
The next group of variables indicates the distribution among the di⁄erent age
cohorts and the number of American Indian parents. There is a slightly higher
proportion of children found in the 9 year old age cohort for the American Indian
parent household than for the non-Indian parent household ￿but this di⁄erence
is not statistically signi￿cant. The second age cohort is much closer in number
distribution between the two types of households. The number of American
Indian parents and the interaction terms di⁄er between the two household types
by design.
The third set of variables provides a look at the household conditions prior to
the opening of the casino for both groups of children. There are level di⁄erences
between all of the initial household conditions except for the gender distribution
for children from both types of households. Children from households with at
6The other races in this data set are White and African-American. The African-American
children make up less than 6% of the total observations; therefore, using Non-Indians refers
to these two other groups but Whites make up the highest proportion of that group.
7least one American Indian parent are much more likely to be American Indian
than from the households with no American Indian parents; however, there are
a few cases where American Indian children reside in households without their
biological American Indian parents. The parental education variables, unlike the
education measures for the child, are given in categories not in years. The value
for the ￿rst parent (3.95) from a household with at least one American Indian
parent corresponds to approximately a high school diploma.7 While statistically
di⁄erent, the actual di⁄erence in years of educational content is very small on
average. The second parent￿ s educational level di⁄ers on average between the
categories of ￿some high school￿and ￿GED or high school equivalency￿for the
two types of households. Finally, the last two variables provide insight into the
economic conditions of the households. On average, households with at least
one American Indian parent have spent at least one year in poverty in the ￿rst
three years of the study while the ￿gure is 0.66 years for the households with no
American Indian parents. Income is also given in categories and the value of 4.58
corresponds to an annual income between $15,001 and $20,000. For households
with no American Indian parents, the average household income value of 6.65
falls in the $25,001 to $30,000 annual income category.
The ￿nal set of variables in this panel provide the criminal activity of the
sample children. These data are gathered independently from the GSMS data.
Searches of public databases in the North Carolina Administrative O¢ ce of the
Courts produced these data. All counties in North Carolina are covered by these
data including arrests made on the American Indian reservation. Arrests after
the 16th birthday fall under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system.
Arrest records were found for juvenile arrests with the permission of the juvenile
court judges. We have classi￿ed the arrest records into three broad categories:
minor arrests which includes arrests for disorderly conduct, trespassing and
shoplifting; moderate arrests which are primarily property crimes that do not
involve serious harm to a person such as simple assault, felony larceny and drug-
related o⁄enses; violent arrests which include sexual assault, armed robbery
and assault with deadly weapons. The ￿rst set of variables reports whether a
child has committed any crime in the years indicated. The categories are not
cumulative and are independent of one another. Therefore, we see that a child
from a household with at least one American Indian parent had a 10 percent
chance of committing any type of crime (minor, moderate, violent) between the
ages 16-17. A child from an American Indian household had a 17% chance
of committing any type of crime between the ages 18-19. The next set of
variables measures whether a child has committed any crime by age 21 by arrest
category. The ￿rst variable indicates that a child from a household with at least
one American Indian parent had a 25 percent chance of having committed a
minor crime by age 21, while the same ￿gure for a household with no American
Indian parents was 29 percent. Interestingly, children from American Indian
households are less likely to have been arrested for all crimes across the board
7Category 3 is a GED or high school equivalency; Category 4 indicates having a high
school diploma in this data; Category 5 indicates some post-high school training or vocational
education.
8and statistically sign￿cantly less (at the 10% level) for moderate crimes by age
21. The ￿nal variable is found within the GSMS survey and indicates the
child￿ s self-reported drug dealing behavior at each survey wave. The mean of
this variable indicates that children from both types of household report having
dealt drugs in 6 percent of the time.
Panel B of Table 1 provides the data used primarily in the ￿xed-e⁄ects
regressions for changes in parental behavior. The ￿rst variable gives the number
of days the child was present in school in the last quarter. This question is
asked at every survey wave while the child is less than 18 years old. There
is no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between children in the two types of
households.
The next set of variables provides characteristics of the mother at each stage
over the survey time period. This variable is coded 1 for individuals who are
in the labor force (working outside of the home) and 0 otherwise. There is
no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the labor force participation of
mothers by household type. Labor force attachment is a categorical variable
which measures (on a scale of 0 to 4) an individual￿ s degree of involvement
in the labor force: a zero indicates full time employment, one indicates part-
time employment, two indicates currently unemployed, three indicates work
only in the home, while four indicates no work whatsoever (student, retired
or disabled). For mothers it does not appear that there is any di⁄erence in
the attachment to the labor force. For mothers who are working, they tend
to be less than full-time employed. The next variable indicates whether an
individual has no drug alcohol problems (coded 0), a single problem (coded
1) or a combination of the two (coded 2). Mothers from households with
at least one American Indian parent have a statistically signi￿cantly higher
incidence of these types of problems. Arrest status is simply an indicator
variable for whether the mother was arrested since the last survey wave. Once
again there is a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence here. The child supervision
variable measures the adequacy of parental supervision of their child. There
are three options here: a zero indicates that the parent has age appropriate
supervision or control over the child; the next option indicates that the parent
does not have adequate control at least once a week; the ￿nal option indicates
that the parent does not have adequate control at least ￿fty percent of the
time or more. The ￿nal variable is a measure of the percentage of parent-child
activities and interactions that are categorized as enjoyable by the child at each
survey wave. The three options possible here are: a zero indicates that at least
75% of all activities are enjoyable; the next option indicates that between 25%
and 74% of all activities are a source of tension, worry or disinterest to the child;
the ￿nal option indicates that less than 25 % of all activities with the parent
are enjoyable to the child. We observe that there is no statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erence between household types for these last two variables. The results
for fathers are presented in the next section. There is a statistically signi￿cant
di⁄erence for fathers by type of household for labor force participation, labor
force attachment, drug or alcohol problems and arrest status.
Table 2 presents a comparison of these initial household characteristics by age
9cohort for each of the two types of households. This table provides information
on the suitability of the third age cohorts to serve as controls for the two other
age cohorts in this study. In this table, t-statistics are presented for a test of a
mean di⁄erence between the indicated age cohorts for a given variable. In the top
panel of Table 2 we show the di⁄erences in age cohorts for households that have
no American Indian parents. There are statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in the
number of American Indian children in these households for cohorts 2 and 3 (age
11 and age 13 initially) and cohorts 1 and 3 (age 9 and age 13 initially). The
di⁄erence is driven by the relatively large amount of American Indian children
in the third age cohort (7%). There is no di⁄erence in the gender distribution
for any of the three cohorts. We do ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
between cohorts 1 and 3 in the ￿rst parent￿ s educational attainment. This
di⁄erence, while statistically signi￿cant, is not large in absolute magnitude (4.5
vs. 5). In qualitative terms the di⁄erence is having a high school diploma versus
having completed some post-high school (non-college) training. We observe little
di⁄erence in education levels for the second parent by age cohorts. We do ￿nd
statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences for household income levels for cohorts 1 and
2 as well as for cohorts 1 and 3. The mean di⁄erence between income categories
is very small here 0.7 and 0.6 for each respectively. Each income category
represents a step of $5,000 each. Therefore, the di⁄erence represented here on
average is between $3,000 - $3,500 per year.
The bottom part of Table 2 provides a similar analysis for the households
with at least one American Indian parent. There appears to be very little dif-
ferences between these age cohorts. The one statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
is found for the second parent￿ s educational level for cohorts 2 and 3. The mean
values for each cohort is 1.7 and 2.7 which indicates a qualitative di⁄erence of
￿some high school￿and ￿GED or high school equivalency￿ . In sum, it appears
that the data are reasonably similar across age cohorts for both types of house-
holds. While there are some statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences, the magnitude
of these di⁄erences for most variables is in fact quite small.
Finally, we provide some evidence on the similarity of the time trends of
the two types of households in the time period prior to the opening of the
casino. It is not, of course, possible to show how the unobserved heterogeneity
e⁄ect evolves over time for the two types of households; however we do show
that the households have similar trends in a number of dimensions. Figure 1
provides the trend in household incomes for the two types of households and
we have already noted that there is a signi￿cant di⁄erence after the opening
of the casino. However, prior to the opening of the casino, the growth in the
percentage of households with incomes greater than $30,000 was similar between
the two groups. Figures 2 and 3 show the changes in the unemployment rate for
mothers and fathers respectively. Both ￿gures indicate that unemployment was
generally decreasing and consistent for both household types. Figure 4 shows
the di⁄erence in reported incidence of alcohol or drug abuse problems for the
second parent (reported by the ￿rst parent).8 The distance between the two
8We take the report of the ￿rst parent about the second parent￿ s drug and alcohol abuse
10time trends decreases slightly between periods 1 and 2, but then is a relatively
constant distance between waves 2 and 3.
Taken together these ￿gures indicate that the two types of households, while
di⁄ering in levels, appear to be equally a⁄ected by the same social conditions,
macroeconomic conditions and labor market experiences. The Eastern Chero-
kee reservation is located in the middle of the eleven counties surveyed in this
research. There is little evidence to support that the two household types are
a⁄ected di⁄erently by changes at the local level in the period prior to the casino
opening.
Additionally, testing between the nature of household types across time, it
appears that there is not statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the composition of
households across time. Appendix Table 1 provides t-tests of di⁄erences between
in marital status for the household types after the casino begins operations. The
additional casino funds does not appear to a⁄ect the marital status of couples
included in this data. This ￿nding indicates that the casino payments are not
creating incentives for the dissolution or the creation of new partnerships which
may directly a⁄ect the young adult outcome of children.
3 The E⁄ects of Exogenous Change in Income
on Young Adult Educational Attainment and
Criminal Behavior
In this section, we present the results from the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence regression
described in equation 1 and the ￿xed-e⁄ects regression described in equation 2.
All of the results control for robust standard errors and employ survey weights.
Where the outcome variables are indicator variables, we use a probit speci￿ca-
tion and report marginal coe¢ cients. For continuous outcome variables, such
as years of education, we use a simple ordinary least squares regression for our
analysis.9
3.1 Education Outcome Variables
Table 3 presents the results from regressions for the educational outcome vari-
ables. The ￿rst column presents the regression of years of completed child￿ s
education at age 21 on the level and interaction variables previously described.
The two interaction variables presented in the ￿rst two rows indicate that there
is a positive, but not statistically signi￿cant, e⁄ect of residing in a household
to be more accurate than the self-reported information about the ￿rst parent￿ s own drug and
alcohol problems. There is reason to suspect that there would be problems with a self-reported
measure of drug and alcohol abuse, but less so with regard to the other parent.
9In the following regressions, the sample sizes vary primarily because of missing information
in the outcome variables. We take advantage of the maximum number of observations possible
for each outcome variable and do not restrict our analysis to a smaller subset. Reducing the
sample size does not appear to a⁄ect the sign or magnitude of results, however, the standard
errors do increase somewhat, as expected.
11with exogenously increased incomes for six or four years relative to just two
years. The other variables of interest in the regression are the parental educa-
tion variables which are positive and statistically signi￿cant as expected. The
average household income variable is also positive and statistically signi￿cant in
this and the other two regressions as well. Column two presents the probability
of a child being a high school graduate by age 19. The marginal coe¢ cient
on the ￿rst interaction variable indicates that the e⁄ect of having four more
years of exogenously increased household income increases a child￿ s probability
of ￿nishing high school by age 19 by almost 15 percent. The second interaction
coe¢ cient is positive, but smaller in absolute magnitude and not statistically
signi￿cant. The third column outcome variable measures whether an individual
has a high school diploma or a general equivalency degree. The ￿rst interaction
coe¢ cient is once again positive but it only reaches statistical signi￿cance at
the 10% level.
3.2 Educational Outcome by Previous Poverty Status
We now investigate whether the exogenous increase in incomes has di⁄ering im-
pact by the prior poverty status of households. Table 4 presents the same analy-
sis as Table 3, except that the sample has been divided according to whether the
household has ever previously been in poverty prior to casino operation.10 We
￿nd in these ￿rst three regressions, for households previously in poverty, that
the coe¢ cient on the ￿rst interaction term is always statistically signi￿cant at
the 5 % level and larger in magnitude than in Table 3. The coe¢ cient for the
interaction variable for the years of education regression triples in size and im-
plies that the treatment of four additional years of exogenously increased income
increases educational attainment at age 21 by almost a full year (0.9 years).11
The coe¢ cient in the two high school graduation and GED regressions increases
in magnitude and are highly statistically signi￿cant. The next set of columns
present the results from the subsample of households that were never previ-
ously in poverty in the ￿rst three survey waves. None of the coe¢ cients on
the interaction variables are statistically signi￿cant. These results explain why
the results for the full sample yielded statistically insigni￿cant results for the
years of education regression ￿the additional household income does not have
a noticeable e⁄ect in households not previously in poverty.
3.3 Education Outcome by Child Gender
We disaggregate the data in this section by the child￿ s gender in order to in-
vestigate whether the additional household income has di⁄erential impacts for
boys or girls. Table 5 presents the same analysis for the educational outcome
10Using the US poverty levels adjusted for household size.
11Future survey waves will collect data on educational attainment when the children are 24
and 25 years old. This will allow for an additional look at the educational attainment as well
as college completion rates.
12variables. In the ￿rst set of columns, the sample is restricted to male chil-
dren and the next set of columns present only the female children￿ s regressions.
Examining the years of education regressions for each gender, it appears that
females are reaping the most bene￿ts from the exogenous increase in household
income; the coe¢ cient is three times as large as that for the males and reaches
statistical signi￿cance at the 10% level.12 The same holds for the probability
of high school graduation by age 19; females have a 21 % higher probability of
￿nishing high school on time when they reside in households with four more
years of exogenously increased incomes. Interestingly, the reverse is true for the
high school diploma or GED regressions. Males have a higher probability of
receiving this type of educational attainment when they come from households
with increased household incomes than the female children.
A secondary check on a child￿ s educational achievement is a simple measure
of school attendance. Given that there is data on the number of days present
in school in the past three months at each interview wave as reported by the
primary parent, we can investigate whether this additional income a⁄ects school
attendance rates throughout childhood. We remove all time-invariant household
characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and control for the time-varying
characteristics directly in our ￿xed-e⁄ects regression. Table 6 presents these
￿xed-e⁄ects results; in the ￿rst column we regress the number of days present
in school in the last three months on the household￿ s casino payment eligibility,
household income, parental ages, child￿ s age and the number of children less
than six years old in the household. The results indicate that casino payment
eligibility increases school attendance by almost two and half days per quarter.
Dividing the data once again by households that previously were in poverty we
￿nd that the e⁄ect almost doubles in size: children from households with this
additional income are present at school for almost four additional days than their
untreated counterparts. The e⁄ect persists, albeit smaller in magnitude and
statistical signi￿cance, for the households that previously were not in poverty.
Overall, the additional household income appears to have a very strong e⁄ect
on the child￿ s school attendance.
3.4 Criminal Behavior during Young Adulthood
Table 7 examines the criminal behavior of all of the sample children. Adminis-
trative data has been merged with the GSMS data at the individual level with
information on the number and nature of each crime for all of the survey chil-
dren. We classi￿ed the arrests into three broad categories of minor, moderate
and violent o⁄enses. Additionally, information about when the arrests occurred
allows us to identify the ages (16-21) of arrests for each person.
The di⁄erence in di⁄erence regressions in Table 7 Panel A indicates that
children from households that receive casino payments are 22% less likely to
12Others have found that increasing household incomes in developing countries can have a
di⁄erential impact on children depending upon their gender; di⁄erent household responsibil-
ities along gender lines imply that additional income will change the composition of work or
duties for the household children. See for instance Chen (2006).
13have been arrested at ages 16-17 than their untreated counterparts. Examining
the e⁄ect on criminality in later years, speci￿cally ages 18 -21, the additional
household income has no direct e⁄ect on criminal arrests for either ￿rst age
cohort or the second age cohort. This result is somewhat puzzling but may be
due to the fact that the children are no longer under their parents direct control
after age 18. Therefore, the diversion in criminal behavior and arrests appears
to be directly related to the child￿ s minor status.
3.5 Criminal Behavior During Young Adulthood by Gen-
der and Previous Poverty Status
The second panel of Table 7 restricts the analysis to males and the reduction in
criminal arrests at ages 16-17 are due primarily to the changes of the boys. The
coe¢ cient on the ￿rst interaction term is larger in magnitude than in the full
sample which includes the females and highly statistically signi￿cant. Similar
analysis for the girls alone results in insigni￿cant results and is not reported
here. We ￿nd that males from households with higher incomes at older ages,
18-21, do not di⁄er systematically in their criminal arrests from households
without the additional income. A ￿nal restriction, provided in the third panel
of Table 7, divides the data by previous household poverty status and ￿nds that
the children from previously poor households were the ones that had the largest
reduction in criminal arrests at age 16 and 17. We ￿nd no results for children
who come from households that were never previously in poverty; this held true
for all the older ages as well (18-21).
3.6 Criminal Behavior During Young Adulthood by Type
of Crime
Table 8 presents the e⁄ect of additional household income on the child￿ s crimi-
nal behavior by the type of crime committed. The ￿rst panel indicates that the
reduction in criminal behavior occurs only in minor crimes. By age 21, a child
who resided in a household with the additional casino income has a 16% lower
probability of having ever committed a minor crime than a similar child from
an untreated household. Further regressions that examined the e⁄ect of addi-
tional household income on the number of crimes (by category) did not yield
signi￿cant results. This indicates that the additional income a⁄ected whether
an individual entered into criminal behavior but not on the number of crimes
once they had entered into criminality. Conducting a separate analysis for males
alone, provided in the second panel of Table 8, we ￿nd that the results hold up
for minor crimes, if slightly diminished in signi￿cance, and become rather strong
for moderate crimes. Consequently, we observe that women have a coe¢ cient
that is positive for moderate crimes, but not statistically signi￿cant at even the
15% level.
The third panel of Table 8 shows that prior household poverty status matters.
However, the direction di⁄ers from that of previous results in that the household
which were never in poverty are the ones that exhibit the largest changes. We
14￿nd that children from households which receive casino payments and were never
previously in poverty had lower levels of minor crimes by age 21. The deterrent
e⁄ect of additional household income on crime appears to matter most for the
previously wealthier households in our sample.
A ￿nal measure of child criminal behavior is provided in Table 9. The
child￿ s self-reported drug dealing activities are regressed on the same set of
explanatory variables used in the previous regression. The ￿rst interaction term
indicates that children from households with exogenously increased incomes are
7% less likely to have reported dealing drugs at all in their youth. Restricting
this to households that were previously in poverty, we ￿nd that the poorer
households are driving the main results - the coe¢ cient changes very little but
loses statistical signi￿cance at the 5% level. Households that previously were
not in poverty do not yield any statistically signi￿cant results.
4 Potential Mechanisms
The previous section provided evidence that the exogenous increase in house-
hold income has positively a⁄ected young adult outcomes for children from these
households. The results indicate that children from households with additional
income have better educational attainment and reduced criminal behavior. In
this section, we discuss a few of the potential mechanisms that may be con-
tributing to the observed changes in child outcomes.
There are several potential explanations for why increased incomes may af-
fect the young adult child outcomes. One potential and direct explanation is that
the additional household income is used to purchase better quality educational
inputs. Unfortunately, the data does not contain consumption or expenditure
data.
4.1 Parental Labor Force Attachment
A second potential explanation is that parents use their additional income to
substitute away from full time employment and into more childrearing. We
have information on both parents￿labor force attachment for each interview
wave. Because we have panel data with regard to the parental labor force at-
tachment, we employ a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression model for mother￿ s and father￿ s
labor force attachment. In the ￿rst panel of Table 10 we regress mother￿ s
labor force attachment on whether the household was eligible for casino dis-
bursements, a lag of household income, number of children less than six years
old in the household and mother￿ s age. The outcome variable is categorical
data for full time employment, part time employment, unemployment, house-
hold employment and out of the labor force status. A negative coe¢ cient on
the casino eligibility variable indicates that the additional household income
increases the labor force attachment of the mother. The coe¢ cient is negative
15and statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level in the second regression. This indi-
cates that mothers are actually increasing their labor force attachment given the
additional income. Creating a binary variable for labor force participation and
running a quasi ￿xed-e⁄ect probit regression (Wooldridge, 2005), we ￿nd that
there is no overall change in mother￿ s labor force participation given the addi-
tional household income. Therefore, the additional household income does not
appear large enough to a⁄ect the mother￿ s labor force participation; however,
it appears to allow mothers to increase their labor force attachment. While it
is not possible to determine exactly what is driving this process, potentially the
additional income allows mothers to a⁄ord child care so that they may work
more at the margin. Nevertheless, the simple explanation that mothers are us-
ing the additional income to substitute away from work into leisure or childcare
is not supported in our data.
While fathers appear to have outcomes that di⁄er from the mothers, they,
too, do not appear to make any signi￿cant changes to their labor force attach-
ment at either the extensive or intensive margins. The coe¢ cients on the casino
income variable are positive, but it loses statistical signi￿cance once father￿ s age
is controlled. Similar to the result found for the mothers, when we examine fa-
ther￿ s labor force participation using a quasi ￿xed-e⁄ects probit regression we
￿nd that the result is highly insigni￿cant.
4.2 Parental Behavior and Quality Measures
A third explanation is that parental quality improves with additional income.
Increased household incomes may translate into lower levels of household stress
and disruption. There is existing research that indicates poverty decreases
parental quality. McLeod et. al. (1993) ￿nd using NLSY data that currently
poor mothers are more likely to spank their children and are less responsive to
child needs. They also ￿nd that the persistence of poverty increases the direct
internalization symptoms in children. Sampson et. al. (1994) ￿nd that poverty
decreases adult stability and good decision-making. Ennis et al. (2000) have
found that poverty can adversely a⁄ect mental health and depression among
parents. Conger (1994) ￿nds direct evidence that not having su¢ cient income
produces stresses on individual parents.
4.2.1 Parental Arrests
Additional information is available with regard to the two parents￿arrests since
the last interview at each survey wave. Table 11 indicates that fathers have
a reduced probability of being arrested when they come from households with
casino payments. This e⁄ect is intensi￿ed for the households that were previ-
ously in poverty, however the sample size falls dramatically and is not shown
here.
164.2.2 Parental Supervision of Children
The two preceding tables appear to indicate that parents are engaging in less
destructive behavior as a result of the increased incomes. This improvement in
parental behavior and choices also tends to spill over into parent-child interac-
tions and supervision. Contained in the GSMS data is a parental supervision
variable which asks the parent at each interview wave the percentage of time
they know their child￿ s whereabouts and activities. In Table 12 we conduct
a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression of the mother and father￿ s reported supervision of
their child on the household￿ s eligibility for casino payments, the child￿ s age,
household income, parental ages and the number of children below age six in
the household. The negative coe¢ cient on the casino disbursement indicates
an improvement in parental supervision (the outcome variable is actually the
inadequacy of parental supervision) for those households receiving additional
income. This is conditional on child￿ s age and the other covariates as well as
the time invariant family ￿xed-e⁄ects. Our results indicate that fathers have an
improvement in supervision of their child with the additional incomes as well.
The third column reports the joint outcome of parental supervision on casino
disbursements; the results indicate that there￿ s an increase in overall supervision
for their children.
4.2.3 Parent-Child Interactions
Finally, Table 13 presents a direct measure of parental quality as reported by
the child. Previous parental behavioral information was provided by the parent
at all survey waves. The variable we consider here measures the amount of
negative interactions between the child and parent from the child￿ s perspective.
In both cases, the estimated coe¢ cient is negative which indicates an improve-
ment in parent ￿child interactions. The results indicate that there is a large
improvement for the relationship between the child and the mother and that
this improvement is statistically signi￿cant. The results are not statistically
signi￿cant with regard to the father, while the estimated coe¢ cient is of the
same sign as the mother.
Overall, the results indicate that parents in households with additional in-
comes make better choices in their personal behavior with regard to drug and
alcohol abuse and criminal behavior. They do not appear to make signi￿cant
changes in their labor force participation e⁄orts. Children report better rela-
tionships overtime in the households with additional income and parents report
better supervision of their children over time in these same households. While
there are many potential causal mechanisms at work here, it is instructive to
learn that parental time is not responsible for the observed changes in child out-
comes. Parental quality and interactions with their children appears to be an
important candidate for explaining how additional household income translates
into better child outcomes.
175 Discussion and Conclusion
Our results indicate that changes in a household￿ s permanent income can have
permanent e⁄ects. The e⁄ect on children continues on into young adulthood in
our sample. We have seen that an exogenous treatment of increasing incomes
tends to improve the overall child outcomes in terms of educational attainment
at ages 19 and 21 and reduced criminal behavior at ages 16 and 17. Given
the unique design of the research, we are able to control for several important
confounding factors that might otherwise be the cause of the observed changes.
We have been able to control for cohort di⁄erences by using a control group of
non-treated households in our sample. Additionally, the comparison between
the age 9 and age 13 cohorts provides us with the counterfactual observations
of a household where incomes were unchanged for a shorter period of time (6
years versus 2 years).
We have also explored a couple of the potential mechanisms that transform
additional household income into better child outcomes. While it is not possible
in this analysis to de￿nitively identify the true causal mechanism responsible
for the improvement in young adult outcomes, we have been able to identify
a few changes in parental behavior (parental quality) that is suggestive of a
mechanism. Parents have a better overall relationship with their children after
the additional household income is introduced as evidenced by responses from
both the parent and child. Additionally, parents appear to have less problems
over time once the exogenous income is introduced: we see that fathers are
less likely to be arrested themselves over time. On the other hand, we do
not have much evidence that the additional income is by parents to make a
dramatic shift from labor force participation towards more child care (parental
quantity). While our data is not perfect, it appears that neither mothers nor
fathers are leaving the labor force because of the additional household income.
There is some evidence, in fact, that mothers may be increasing their labor
force attachment (work intensity) but we do not have actual hours of work here,
so our results once again do not provide conclusive evidence. More research
that focuses on the mechanisms that translate household incomes into child
well-being is certainly needed.
It is important to note the di⁄erences from this research and previous ef-
forts. The program described here di⁄ers in at least two dimensions: size and
duration. The size of the casino payments is large relative to other income
augmentation programs and certainly with regard to other quasi-experimental
policies. The additional $5-10,000 dollars per year represents anywhere from
1/4 to 1/3 of many of these household￿ s incomes. Second, this casino dis-
bursement program has no foreseeable end date. While it is contingent upon
successful and continued operations of the casino, there has been no indication
that there would be a change in the program or that pro￿ts have decreased
over time. Therefore, people treat these changes in their income as permanent
and spend accordingly. These two e⁄ects are probably responsible for the large
e⁄ects found in this research which are not often evident in studies with smaller
amounts and temporary income changes.
18Future work will allow us to explore the e⁄ect of this additional income on
the geographic mobility of the children. The casino payments are not limited
by geographic proximity to the Eastern Cherokee reservation. Therefore, in fu-
ture work we anticipate evaluating how this additional income has increased the
geographic distribution of these children from American Indian households- indi-
viduals may move out of state and they will still be eligible for casino payments.
In future survey waves we shall also have additional employment information
for the children at ages 24 and 25 which will allow us to explore whether they
di⁄erentially enter into di⁄erent occupations and industries and any resulting
wage di⁄erentials.
6 Appendix I
In this appendix, we discuss a few of the robustness tests that we conduct to
investigate whether these observed outcomes were already prevalent in the data
prior to the advent of the casino payments. With regard to the children￿ s
outcomes, it is unfortunately not possible to run placebo tests on all of the
outcomes variables as many of them have little meaning at earlier ages. For
instance, high school completion rates will be uniformly zero in the period prior
to the casino operations as the children are all below the ages of 15 in this time
period. . Therefore, it is not possible to create a placebo test in these cases.
We can, however, investigate whether there is any di⁄erence in number of days
of school attendance in the previous three months in the period prior to the
casino operations given the panel nature of the data. In Appendix Table 2 we
restrict analysis to the four survey waves prior to the casino opening and create
a false treatment that occurs in wave 3 and 4 only; we ￿nd that there is no e⁄ect
on children￿ s schooling attendance in this ￿xed e⁄ects regression. Previously
in Table 6 we established that the additional household income increased school
attendance by an average of 2.5 days. The second model in Appendix Table 2
provides the di⁄erence in di⁄erence regression for educational attainment at age
16. There appears to be no di⁄erence for the two interaction variables in this
regression. However, school attendance is compulsory up to age 16 in North
Carolina and therefore, we are not clear whether ￿nding no result is due to there
being no actual di⁄erence in behavior or because of the e⁄ect of the law.
Additionally, the arrest data that we have collected on the children in this
survey is for ages 16-21, therefore, it is not possible to create a placebo test
here in the period prior to the casino operations. Although we have no data
on arrests at this early age it would also most likely be a very low probability
event and any resulting tests would be expected to have very low power in any
case.
Examining parental changes in the period prior to casino disbursements is
a little more straightforward. Appendix Table 3 provides outcomes for parents
when the period is restricted to the ￿rst four survey waves as above. A placebo
19treatment is created for waves 3 and 4 as we did for the school attendance rates
previously. In column one and two, we show that there is no statistical di⁄erence
in the labor force attachment outcome variable for parents prior to the casino
disbursements and operations. The next two sets of columns provides the same
analysis for mother￿ s and father￿ s activities with the child. We see once again
that there is no statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the casino disbursement
eligibility variable. The last two columns provides the placebo test for mothers￿
and fathers￿ supervision of their children. While the coe¢ cients on casino
disbursement eligibility is statistically signi￿cant in both cases it is in positive
- indicating that prior to the casino operations mothers and fathers in these
households actually had a lower level of supervision of their children. In Table
12 we have previously shown that the exact opposite occurs once the additional
household income arrives from the casino disbursements; parents have better
supervision of their children when their incomes are exogenously increased.
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Years of Education 11.21 11.96 -4.10
High School Graduation Probability at 
age 19 0.62 0.69 -2.12
Received a GED or Graduated from 
High School at age 19 0.76 0.82 -2.26
Age, Parents and Interaction Variables
Age Cohort Initially 9 Year Olds 0.39 0.35 1.26
Age Cohort Initially 11 Year Olds 0.33 0.34 -0.51
Age Cohort Initially 13 Year Olds ref. ref.
Number of American Indian Parents 1.34 0.00 20.63
Interaction Age 9 Cohort x Number of 
American Indian Parents 0.52 0.00 17.98
Interaction Age 11 Cohort x Number 
of American Indian Parents 0.45 0.00 79.58
Household Characteristics
Male Child Indicator 0.52 0.53 -0.29
Parent 1's Educational Level 3.95 4.92 -5.63
Parent 2's Educational Level 2.15 3.06 -4.11
Average Years Household in Poverty 
over initial 3 years 1.40 0.66 9.60
Average Household Income (by 
category) for first 3 years 4.58 6.65 -8.79
Crime Variables
Any Crime Ages 16-17 0.10 0.14 -1.72
Any Crime Ages 18-19 0.17 0.22 -1.81
Any Crime Ages 20-21 0.16 0.15 0.28
Any Minor Crime by Age 21 0.25 0.29 -1.10
Any Moderate Crime by Age 21 0.09 0.14 -1.79
Any Violent Crime by Age 21 0.04 0.05 -0.86
Ever Dealt Drugs by Age 21 0.06 0.06 -0.47
Note: Sample size is 1060 observations for all three age cohorts when they are 21  years of age
Table 1:  Mean Values for Variables
At least one AI 
Parent Household 
No AI Parent 
Household







Days Present at School in Last 
Quarter 39.64 39.15 1.27 3317
Mother's Characteristics
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.88 0.87 1.14 6780
Labor Force Attachment 0.76 0.78 -0.61 6780
Drug or Alcohol Problem 0.24 0.13 8.66 5333
Arrest Status  0.12 0.06 7.51 5333
Supervision of Child 0.08 0.10 -0.79 5758
Activities spent with Child 0.21 0.20 0.97 6673
Father's Characteristics
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.90 0.93 -3.95 4161
Labor Force Attachment 0.59 0.33 6.63 4161
Drug or Alcohol Problem 0.08 0.05 2.75 3316
Arrest Status  0.27 0.13 9.18 3309
Supervision of Child 0.05 0.06 -0.41 5758
Activities spent with Child 0.18 0.15 1.30 3829
Note: Sample size differs across these variables due to missing information. 
At least one AI 
Parent Household 
No AI Parent 
Household
Panel B: Fixed Effect Regressions
Table 1:  Mean Values for Variables, cont.Difference Between 
Cohort 1 and 2
Difference Between 
Cohort 2 and 3
Difference Between 
Cohort 1 and 3
Number of American 
Indian Parents
American Indian 
Indicator -1.43 -2.00 -3.35
Male Child Indicator -0.93 1.84 0.95
Parent 1's Educational 
Level -1.08 -1.39 -2.36
Parent 2's Educational 
Level -0.47 -0.09 -0.53
Household Income -2.47 0.36 -2.04
Note: Each cell provides t-statistics for a test of difference in means
Difference Between 
Cohort 1 and 2
Difference Between 
Cohort 2 and 3
Difference Between 
Cohort 1 and 3
Number of American 
Indian Parents -0.49 1.29 0.84
American Indian 
Indicator -1.89 1.86 0.04
Male Child Indicator -0.56 0.05 -0.46
Parent 1's Educational 
Level -0.29 0.51 0.27
Parent 2's Educational 
Level 1.05 -2.56 -1.50
Household Income 0.34 -1.60 -1.29
Table 2: Differences by Age Cohort and American Indian Parent Status
Households with No American Indian Parent
Households with at least one American Indian ParentIndependent Variables Coeff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x Number of American 
Indian Parents
0.332 0.477 0.149*** 0.072 0.080* 0.046
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x Number of American 
Indian Parents
-0.039 0.347 0.029 0.065 0.022 0.040
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) -0.143 0.291 -0.009 0.060 -0.005 0.039
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) 0.256 0.275 < 0.001 0.055 -0.007 0.037
Number of American Indian Parents in Household -0.111 0.426 -0.122* 0.066 -0.092** 0.039
American Indian -0.400 0.480 0.053 0.060 0.046 0.034
Sex -0.547** 0.227 -0.118*** 0.043 -0.070** 0.030
Parent 1 Education 0.221*** 0.052 0.013 0.009 0.014** 0.006
Parent 2 Education 0.080* 0.043 0.020*** 0.008 0.022*** 0.005
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable -0.183 0.165 -0.054* 0.028 -0.033* 0.018
Average HH Income 0.163 0.051 0.020** 0.010 0.010 0.007
Constant 10.298*** 0.509
Observations 1044 1059 1059
Wald Chi-Squared (15) 33.33 95.81 94.5
Pseudo R2 0.2731 0.1645 0.1936
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Table 3:  Education Variables
Years of Education, Age 
21
Probability of HS Grad, 
Age 19
Prob of HS Grad/GED, 
Age 19Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error Marg. Eff. Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
0.903* 0.462 0.336*** 0.133 0.239** 0.115 -0.111 0.787 0.124 0.086 0.040 0.053
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
0.169 0.462 0.190 0.137 0.112 0.115 -0.240 0.509 0.006 0.071 0.001 0.045
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) -0.612 0.532 -0.130 0.126 -0.050 0.121 0.096 0.360 0.037 0.049 0.012 0.031
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) 0.299 0.526 -0.156 0.126 -0.021 0.121 0.263 0.322 0.048 0.045 0.003 0.029
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household -0.659* 0.402 -0.451*** 0.130 -0.348*** 0.108 0.309 0.603 0.010 0.074 -0.001 0.046
American Indian -0.038 0.423 0.237** 0.104 0.201** 0.082 -0.906 0.696 -0.054 0.090 -0.030 0.061
Sex -0.528 0.366 -0.097 0.092 -0.070 0.087 -0.528* 0.283 -0.099** 0.040 -0.063** 0.026
Parent 1 Education 0.177** 0.088 0.011 0.023 0.037* 0.022 0.243*** 0.062 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.005
Parent 2 Education 0.053 0.074 0.009 0.024 0.065*** 0.020 0.085* 0.049 0.018*** 0.006 0.012*** 0.004
Average HH Income 0.263** 0.133 0.066* 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.133** 0.060 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.005
Constant 9.956*** 0.852 10.332*** 0.583
Number 437 443 443 607 616 616
Wald Chi-Squared (15) 6.03 28.07 36.94 11.49 45.53 32.6
Pseudo R2 0.146 0.065 0.115 0.204 0.111 0.121
Years of Education, Age 
21
Probability of HS Grad, 
Age 19
Prob of HS Grad/GED, 
Age 19
Probability of HS Grad, 
Age 19
Prob of HS Grad/GED, 
Age 19
Table 4:  Education Variables by Poverty Status
Household Previously in Poverty Household Not Previously in Poverty
Years of Education, Age 
21Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Marg. EffStd Error Marg. Eff. Std Error Marg. EfStd Error Marg. Eff.Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
0.315 0.452 0.137 0.105 0.158** 0.069 0.992* 0.580 0.218*** 0.082 0.061 0.043
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
0.181 0.438 0.040 0.097 0.092 0.065 0.066 0.468 0.055 0.077 -0.016 0.039
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.054 0.415 0.066 0.097 0.035 0.064 -0.361 0.408 -0.097 0.070 -0.048 0.046
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.035 0.416 0.053 0.086 -0.027 0.065 0.354 0.370 -0.059 0.067 -0.005 0.034
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household -0.071 0.411 -0.069 0.092 -0.113 0.057 -0.531 0.592 -0.159** 0.080 -0.044 0.036
American Indian -0.326 0.439 0.001 0.099 0.006 0.062 -0.372 0.715 0.048 0.060 0.025 0.029
Parent 1 Education 0.174** 0.084 0.009 0.016 0.003 0.011 0.255*** 0.064 0.016* 0.010 0.020*** 0.007
Parent 2 Education 0.113* 0.059 0.013 0.012 0.030*** 0.009 0.064 0.059 0.026*** 0.008 0.014*** 0.004
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.062 0.238 0.005 0.046 0.003 0.032 -0.371 0.227 -0.091*** 0.032 -0.045*** 0.016
Average HH Income 0.277*** 0.083 0.0455*** 0.016 0.027** 0.011 0.079 0.062 -0.004 0.012 -0.002 0.006
Constant 8.91*** 0.730 10.923*** 0.655
Number 547 552 552 497 507 507
Wald Chi-Squared (15) 17.910 38.750 48.160 23.360 72.160 88.980
Pseudo R2 0.265 0.125 0.166 0.284 0.220 0.264
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Table 5:  Education Variables by Child's Gender
Male Child Female Child
Years of Education, 
Age 21
Probability of HS 
Grad, Age 19
Prob of HS 
Grad/GED, Age 
19
Years of Education, 
Age 21
Probability of 
HS Grad, Age 
19
Prob of HS 
Grad/GED, Age 19Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Household Eligible for 
Casino Disbursement 2.442** 1.124 3.85** 1.914 2.485* 1.419
Household Income -0.298** 0.145 0.142 0.266 -0.421** 0.174
Primary Parent's Age -0.181* 0.093 -0.212 0.266 -0.159 0.125
Secondary Parent's Age -0.056 0.068 -0.193 0.114 0.058 0.085
Age of Child 0.105 0.174 -0.768** 0.346 0.283 0.209
Number of Children Less 
than 6 years old 0.448 0.604 1.157 0.896 -0.547 0.853
Constant 49.373*** 3.416 64.825*** 5.945 43.034*** 4.469
Number of obs     3317 1120 2197
Number of groups  1110 444 666
 Wald chi2(7)  2.550 3.95 2.04
 Prob > chi2   0.0183 0.0007 0.0571
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Number of Days Present 
Within the Last 3 Months if 
Household Never in Poverty
Table 6:  Child School Attendance
Number of Days Present 
Within the Last 3 
Months
Number of Days Present 
Within the Last 3 Months if 
Household Previously in 
PovertyIndependent Variables Marg Coeff Std Error Marg Coeff Std Error Marg Coeff Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
-0.226*** 0.076 -0.047 0.073 0.052 0.075
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents
-0.108* 0.062 -0.020 0.069 0.008 0.062
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.077* 0.043 -0.018 0.053 -0.072** 0.034
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.017 0.037 -0.042 0.049 -0.059* 0.034
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household 0.125 0.090 -0.050 0.064 0.090 0.078
American Indian -0.051 0.049 -0.019 0.058 -0.092*** 0.030
Sex 0.069** 0.029 0.149*** 0.040 0.110*** 0.032
Parent 1 Education -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.009 0.000 0.007
Parent 2 Education -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.006
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.004 0.017 0.013 0.026 0.014 0.018
Average HH Income -0.006 0.006 -0.004 0.009 -0.004 0.007
  Number of obs 1092 1060 1044
  F( 11,  1032) 43.87 25.75 29.76
  Prob > F      0 0.0071 0.0017
  R-squared     0.0763 0.0534 0.0709
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Independent Variables Marg Coeff Std Error Marg Coeff Std Error Marg Coeff Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.251*** 0.089 -0.028 0.112 -0.055 0.092
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.169* 0.093 -0.056 0.106 -0.133 0.109
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.107 0.071 0.054 0.093 -0.088 0.063
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.036 0.057 0.009 0.083 -0.017 0.071
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household 0.222* 0.128 -0.042 0.092 0.155 0.129
American Indian -0.111* 0.058 -0.052 0.096 -0.114 0.072
Sex
Parent 1 Education 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.003 0.013
Parent 2 Education -0.007 0.008 -0.015 0.013 0.004 0.010
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.021 0.027 0.002 0.043 0.037 0.033
Average HH Income -0.004 0.010 -0.013 0.015 -0.007 0.011
  Number of obs 587 553 547
  F( 11,  1032) 20.37 11.37 11.96
  Prob > F      0.026 0.330 0.287
  R-squared     0.062 0.031 0.035
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Committed Any Crime if 
Male, Age 16-17
Committed Any Crime 
if Male, Age 18-19
Committed Any Crime 
if Male, Age 20-21
Table 7:  Any Criminal Behavior of the Child in Young Adulthood
Committed Any Crime, 
Age 16-17
Committed Any Crime, 
Age 18-19
Committed Any Crime, 
Age 20-21Independent Variables Marg Coeff Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.244*** 0.084
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.060 0.066
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.259*** 0.078
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) 0.044 0.055
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household 0.071 0.071
American Indian 0.004 0.065
Sex 0.091* 0.052
Parent 1 Education -0.011 0.013
Parent 2 Education -0.001 0.014
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable -0.011 0.033
Average HH Income -0.011 0.020
  Number of obs 465
  F( 11,  1032) 27.98
  Prob > F      0.003
  R-squared     0.138
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Committed Any Crime if 
Household Previously in 
Poverty, Age 16-17
Table 7 cont:  Any Criminal Behavior of the Child in Young AdulthoodIndependent Variables Marg. Coeff Std Error Marg. Coeff Std Error Marg. CoeffStd Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.167* 0.086 -0.006 0.064 -0.002 0.013
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.072 0.084 -0.024 0.047 -0.009 0.014
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) -0.059 0.056 -0.016 0.026 0.000 0.010
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.096* 0.054 -0.043** 0.022 0.014 0.013
Number of American Indian Parents 
in Household 0.095 0.092 0.118* 0.067 -0.003 0.009
American Indian -0.099 0.067 -0.074*** 0.015 0.003 0.010
Sex 0.179 0.044 0.072*** 0.024 0.047*** 0.014
Parent 1 Education -0.001 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.002
Parent 2 Education -0.012 0.008 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 0.002
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.059* 0.029 0.013 0.013 -0.001 0.004
Average HH Income 0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.005 -0.004*** 0.002
Number of obs  1044.000 1044 1044
Wald chi2(10)  40.150 46.81 55.160
Prob > chi2    0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2      0.073 0.096 0.164
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Independent Variables Marg. Coeff Std Error Marg. Coeff Std Error Marg. CoeffStd Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.185 0.115 -0.162** 0.075 -0.032 0.047
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.162 0.135 -0.132* 0.080 -0.054 0.046
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) -0.061 0.090 -0.038 0.052 0.017 0.035
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.095 0.088 -0.051 0.048 0.061 0.050
Number of American Indian Parents 
in Household 0.209 0.142 0.161 0.122 -0.009 0.034
American Indian -0.210** 0.103 -0.104** 0.046 0.001 0.031
Sex
Parent 1 Education 0.010 0.016 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.006
Parent 2 Education -0.020 0.014 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.005
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.083* 0.046 0.028 0.027 -0.005 0.014
Average HH Income 0.011 0.016 -0.009 0.009 -0.012* 0.007
Number of obs  547 547 547
Wald chi2(10)  14.83 26.93 24.96
Prob > chi2    0.138 0.003 0.005
Pseudo R2      0.040 0.063 0.085
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Table 8:  Likelihood of Committing Crime by Type at Any Time in Late Teen Years (16-21)
Ever Committed A Minor 
Crime by Age 21
Ever Committed A 
Moderate Crime by Age 
21
Ever Committed A 
Violent Crime by Age 
21
Ever Committed A Minor 
Crime by Age 21 if Male
Moderate Crime by Age 
21 if Male
Violent Crime by Age 
21 if MaleIndependent Variables Marg. Coeff Std Error Marg. Coeff Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.146 0.111 -0.231* 0.136
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian Parents
-0.020 0.111 -0.118 0.119
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.137 0.116 -0.129** 0.056
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) -0.017 0.117 -0.119** 0.055
Number of American Indian Parents 
in Household 0.085 0.095 0.114 0.116
American Indian -0.142* 0.084 -0.033 0.108
Sex 0.252*** 0.085 0.150* 0.050
Parent 1 Education 0.009 0.025 -0.005 0.010
Parent 2 Education -0.014 0.020 -0.013 0.008
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable 0.016 0.065
Average HH Income 0.037 0.037 0.013 0.010
Number of obs  437 607
Wald chi2(10)  18.18 29.32
Prob > chi2    0.078 0.001
Pseudo R2      0.078 0.077
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Ever Committed A Minor 
Crime by Age 21 if 
Household Previously in 
Poverty
Ever Committed A Minor 
Crime by Age 21 if 
Household Never 
Previously in Poverty
Table 8 cont:  Likelihood of Committing Crime by Type at Any Time in Late Teen Years (16-21)Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.072** 0.033 -0.073 0.055
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x 
Number of American Indian 
Parents -0.010 0.020 -0.013 0.040
Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.003 0.016 -0.005 0.034
Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) 0.025 0.018 0.048 0.038
Number of American Indian 
Parents in Household -0.013 0.018 -0.021 0.036
American Indian 0.036 0.029 0.031 0.039
Sex 0.066*** 0.012 0.075*** 0.022
Parent 1 Education 0.005** 0.003 0.005 0.006
Parent 2 Education -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.006
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable -0.004 0.007 -0.013 0.015
Average HH Income -0.007** 0.003 -0.007 0.010
Number of obs  1044 437.000
Wald chi2(10)  59.90 18.660
Prob > chi2    0.000 0.068
Pseudo R2      0.125 0.097
Table 9:  Likelihood of Dealing Drugs
Ever Dealt Drugs by 
Age 21
Ever Dealt Drugs by Age 21 
if Household Previously in 
PovertyIndependent VariablesCoeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Marg. Coeff Std Error
Household Eligible 
for Casino 
Disbursement -0.171** 0.074 -0.153* 0.079 0.069 0.196
Lag of Household 
Income -0.013 0.011 -0.010 0.011 0.021 0.028
Number of 
Children Less than 
6 years old 0.086* 0.045 0.077* 0.046 0.031 0.096
Mother's Age -0.010 0.008 0.012 0.018
Mother's Initial 
Labor Force Status 0.964*** 0.145
Constant 0.817*** 0.073 1.170*** 0.311 0.117 0.358
Number of obs     3567 3487 Number of obs    3318
Number of groups  1145 1140 Number of group 1076
 Wald chi2(7)  4.01 3.350  Wald chi2(9)  343.31
 Prob > chi2   0.0074 0.0095  Prob > chi2   0
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% leve. 




0.121* 0.068 0.077 0.071 -0.011 0.384
Lag of Household 
Income -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.010 0.072 0.072
Number of 
Children Less than 
6 years old 0.024 0.051 0.030 0.051 -0.235 0.285
Father's Age 0.005 0.007 -0.102** 0.044
Father's Initial 
Labor Force Status 2.093** 0.582
Constant 0.358*** 0.074 0.134 0.277 0.423 0.765
Number of obs     2227 2177 Number of obs   1988
Number of groups  729 723 Number of grou 643
 Wald chi2(7)  1.22 0.740 Wald chi2(9) 105.95
 Prob > chi2   0.3023 0.5676 Prob > chi2  0.00
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 
10% level. 
Note: Probit regression includes the mean over all time periods for the following variables: household 
eligibility for casino, mother's age, the lag of household income, number of children below age 6
Mother's Labor Force Attachment
Table 10:  Parents' Employment Status Changes
Mother's Labor Force 
Participation
Father's Labor Force 
Participation Father's Labor Force Attachment
Note: Probit regression includes the mean over all time periods for the following variables: household 
eligibility for casino, mother's age, the lag of household income, number of children below age 6Independent Variables Marg. CoeffStd Error Marg. CoeffStd Error
Household Eligible for Casino 
Disbursement -0.181 0.210 -0.550** 0.260
Mother's Age -0.036 0.022
Father's Age -0.043 0.032
Household Income 0.026 0.035 -0.137** 0.064
Labor Force Status - Mother -0.105** 0.052
Labor Force Status - Father 0.053 0.143
Number of Children Less than 6 
years old 0.160 0.103 -0.044** 0.020
Initial Arrest Status for Mother 0.821*** 0.127
Initial Arrest Status for Father 0.699*** 0.113
Number of obs     3473 2158
Number of groups  1135 721
 Wald chi2(7)  523.46 458.200
 Prob > chi2   0 0
Note: The first regressions includes means for all of the independent variables over all time 
periods: household eligibility for casino, mother's age, household income, labor force status of 
the mother, number of children below age 6; the second regression includes : household 
eligibility for casino, father's age, household income, labor force status of the father, number 
of children below age 6. This is a random effects probit specification as suggested by 
Wooldridge (2005).
Table 11:  Parent's Arrest Since the Last Interview
Mother Arrest Since 
Last Interview
Father Arrest Since Last 
InterviewIndependent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Household Eligible for Casino 
Disbursement
-0.105*** 0.041 -0.154*** 0.056 -0.277** 0.125
Household Income 0.011* 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.020 0.019
Mother's Age -0.006 0.011 0.102 0.098
Father's Age 0.017 0.021 0.012 0.020
Age of Child 0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.008 -0.008 0.020
Number of Children Less than 
6 years old 0.021*** 0.009 0.038*** 0.011 0.069*** 0.027
Labor Force Status - Mother 0.027 0.023 0.002 0.033
Labor Force Status - Father 0.067* 0.040 0.038 0.047
Constant -0.397** 0.182 -0.295 0.250 -1.024* 0.621
Number of obs     3802 2365 2025.0
Number of groups  1163 745 637
 Wald chi2(7)  5.74 5.260 3.5
 Prob > chi2   0 0 0.0
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Mother's Supervision Father's Supervision Parental Supervision
Table 12:  Parental SupervisionIndependent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Household Eligible for 
Casino Disbursement
-0.089* 0.046 -0.054 0.057
Household Income 0.012** 0.006 0.003 0.007
Number of Children 
Less than 6 years old 0.033 0.026 -0.007 0.041
Mother's Age 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.009
Age of Child 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.012
Constant -0.243 0.195 -0.427 0.264
Number of obs     3910 2448
Number of groups  1172 760
 Wald chi2(7)  3.73 2.310
 Prob > chi2   0.0023 0.0422
Table 13:  Activities With Parent
Activities With Mother Activities With Father
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 
5% level and * at the 10% level. Figure 1: Household Income By American Indian 
















































































































ParentFigure 4: Second Parent's Reported Drug and 


























one AI ParentComparison Ages: 12/13 with 14 14 with 15 15 with 16 12/13 with 16
Age Group 1 -0.377 -0.898 -0.513 0.270
Age Group 2 1.400 0.520 -0.794 0.000
Age Group 3 -0.530 0.522 0.444 -0.545
Age Group 1 0.000 -0.650 -0.145 1.040
Age Group 2 0.140 -0.146 -0.146 0.044














































Appendix Table 1: Comparison of Marital Status of Parents Across Time by Age Cohort and Household Type
Note: Reported figures are t-ratios for difference in the mean value of whether the child's parents are currently 
married at each survey wave.  Ages 12 or 13 are used as not every age group was surveyed at ages 12 and 13, 
therefore, we combine those years for comparison. Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error
Household Eligible for 
Casino Disbursement
-0.919 1.081
Interaction 1: Age Cohort 1 x Number 
of American Indian Parents
-0.012 0.130
Household Income -0.448** 0.207
Interaction 2: Age Cohort 2 x Number 
of American Indian Parents
-0.062 0.139
Mother's Age -0.200 0.131 Age Cohort 1 (9 yo) 0.148* 0.080
Father's Age -0.027 0.089 Age Cohort 2 (11 yo) 0.203*** 0.078
Child's Age -0.411 0.346
Number of American Indian Parents in 
Household 0.069 0.109
Number of Children Less 
than 6 years old 0.481 0.853 American Indian 0.034 0.141
Constant 56.827*** 5.879 Sex -0.072 0.062
Parent 1 Education -0.009 0.013
Parent 2 Education 0.004 0.011
HH in Poverty Indicator Variable -0.081** 0.044
Average HH Income 0.016 0.015
Constant 8.992 0.144
  Number of obs     2372  Number of obs  1064
  Number of groups  1062  F( 11,  1052)  2.67
   F(6,1304)   2.92  Prob > F       0.0022
   Prob > F    0.0079  R-squared      0.0655
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Appendix Table 2:  Placebo Tests on Children's Outcomes




Note: The first regression is conducted with a child fixed effect and is restricted to only the first four survey waves, with a placebo treatment 
introduced in waves 3 and 4.  The second regression restricts analysis to age 16 for all of the children, which is five years earlier than the 
analysis presented in the main part of the paper; compulsory schooling laws may play a role as ages 7-16 are compulsory in North Carolina.Independent Variables Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error
Household Eligible for 
Casino Disbursement -0.092 0.072 -0.027 0.066 0.058 0.051 -0.039 0.056 0.078** 0.039 0.131*** 0.050
Household Income 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.014 -0.003 0.010 -0.009 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.011
Number of Children Less 
than 6 years old 0.034 0.058 0.145** 0.074 -0.003 0.038 -0.002 0.060 0.010 0.029 -0.003 0.054
Mother's Age -0.022* 0.012 -0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.007
Father's Age 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.010 -0.005 0.009
Child's Age 0.003 0.017 0.041** 0.020 0.024* 0.013 0.036** 0.018
Labor Force Participation Mother 0.018 0.013
Labor Force Participation Father -0.012 0.024
Constant 1.594*** 0.466 0.159 0.441 0.246 0.303 -0.454 0.365 -0.165 0.245 -0.320 0.326
  Number of obs     2655 1644 2727 1697 2721 1685
  Number of groups  1114 699 1135 724 1135 718
   F(6,1304)   1.69 1.03 0.36 1.39 2.59 4.12
   Prob > F    0.1495 0.3885 0.8743 0.2258 0.0169 0.0004
Note: *** indicates coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
Mother's Activities Father's Activities Father's Supervision Mother's Supervision
Note: All regressions contain a household fixed effect and is restricted to only the first four survey waves, with a placebo treatment introduced in waves 3 and 4. 
Mother's Labor Force  Father's Labor Force 
Appendix Table 3:  Placebo Tests on Parental Behaviors